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How does equity capital cost affect
bank performance during a
financial crisis?
Jeng-Yan Tsaia,* and Shi Chenb
aDepartment of International Business, Tamkang University, New Taipei
City, Taiwan
bSchool of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and
Economics, Chengdu 611130, China
This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return
performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a
ﬁnancial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s
performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of
higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the
bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the
Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal
bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by
ignoring the dislike, we ﬁnd that the better performance is reinforced
during a ﬁnancial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial
crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return
and the stability of banking activities.
Keywords: bank interest margin; equity capital cost; barrier; utility
maximization
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21; G33
I. Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crises raise fundamental issues
about the role of bank equity capital, particularly
from the standpoint of bank performance related to
proﬁtability and stability. Not surprisingly, public
outcries for increasing more bank capital during a
ﬁnancial crisis due to the safety net provided to banks
because of the existence of externalities. And, thus
ﬁnancial efﬁciency can be improved by requiring
banks to operate with more capital (Berger and
Bouwman, 2013).1 However, bankers often argue
that holding more capital would jeopardize their per-
formance and lead to less lending.2 Given the diver-
gent views in the literature, the issue of the effect of
the capital cost instead of the capital quantity on bank
performance largely remains silent. Equity capital
cost is often used as a proxy for an opportunity cost
*Corresponding author. E-mail: tsaijy@mail.tku.edu.tw
1Related literature includes, for example, Kashyap et al. (2008), Acharya et al. (2011) and Hart and Zingales (2011).
2Academic literature argues that the perspective of the bankers need to be more nuanced (e.g. Jimenéz et al., 2012; Osborne
et al., 2012).
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of shareholders’ investment, generally valued by the
security market interest rate. Banks can hold liquid
assets, for example, central bank reserves and/or
Treasury bills, for a substitution purpose of earning
asset portfolio. These assets earn the security market
interest rate. Knowing how bank equity capital cost
affects bank performance at different times (during a
ﬁnancial crisis and a normal time) is of paramount
importance not only for bank managers to make their
strategic decisions but also for regulators to contem-
plate micro- and macro-prudential banking regula-
tion. The goal of this article is to theoretically
examine the effect of equity capital cost on bank
return performance, explicitly integrating the default
risk with the equity volatility into a bank’s utility
maximization progress.
Banks are in the business of lending and borrow-
ing money.3 The bank interest margin, that is, the
spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate, is
one of the principal elements of cash ﬂows and earn-
ings. The bank interest margin is often used in the
literature as a proxy for the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial
intermediation (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).4
The purpose of this article is to develop a model of
bank spread behaviour by incorporating alternative
preference considerations into a path-dependent, bar-
rier option model. Our model features bank prefer-
ences revealing the like of higher net equity return,
that is, equity return net of equity capital cost, and/or
the dislike of higher equity risk in the spirit of
Hermalin (2005). Path dependency based on the
argument of Brockman and Turtle (2003) is an intrin-
sic and a fundamental characteristic of bank loans
because the net equity return can be knocked out
whenever a legally binding barrier is breached.
Banks, during a period of a ﬁnancial crisis, with
high asset variability are likely to exhibit a higher
probability of hitting the barrier before the expiration
date than banks without such a characteristic. The
inclusion of equity capital costs based on the argu-
ment of Peura and Keppo (2006) is an explicit treat-
ment of the bank equity capital investment related to
the opportunity costs of equity holders.
The results of this article show that an increase in
the equity capital cost results in a decreased loan
amount held by a bank at an increased bank interest
margin. Equity capital cost as such makes the bank
less prone to risk-taking, thereby contributing to a
better return performance and the stability of the
banking system.Most theories predict that the capital
amount can enhance a bank’s survival probability.
Holding ﬁxed bank’s asset, liability portfolios and
higher capital mechanically implies a lower likeli-
hood of bankruptcy (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). A
deeper justiﬁcation is provided by our theoretical
model. Higher equity capital cost perhaps due to an
increase in the security market interest rate by the
regulatory authority makes the bank more prudent to
shift its investments to the Federal funds market and
away from its loan portfolio. And, this leads to less
probability during a ﬁnancial crisis. Our results are
largely supported by Mehran and Thakor (2011) and
Thakor (2012).
Further, the two distinctions for our argument are
whether bank preference reveals the dislike of higher
equity risk or not and whether path dependency takes
place. Both are relevant to the default risk in the
bank’s net equity return. Together they lead to the
following four scenarios of the bank’s utility optimi-
zation problems: (i) both with the barrier and the
dislike; (ii) only with the barrier; (iii) only with the
dislike and (iv) neither with the barrier nor the dis-
like. One immediate application of this article is to
evaluate the plethora of modelling the bank’s utility
optimization problems proposed as alternatives for
bank performance evaluation. We show that the posi-
tive impact on the bank interest margin from an
increase in equity capital cost is less signiﬁcant
with consideration of both the barrier and the equity
risk than the case of only either one being taken into
account. In addition, the positive impact is less sig-
niﬁcant in the barrier case than that in the equity risk
case, and is also less signiﬁcant when both are
ignored.
The regulation literature on bank performance is
not even new but unsatisfying. When an increase in
3Two divergent approaches have been employed in the literature to model the ﬁnancial intermediary (Sealey, 1980). The
Markowitz–Tobin portfolio theory has the principal advantage of the explicit treatment of uncertainty. However, this
approach assumes that asset and deposit markets are perfectly competitive. Klein (1971) bases his criticism on the existence
of imperfectly competitive structures and shows that basic theorems of portfolio theory are not applicable under imperfect
market structures. This article follows the spirit of the ﬁrm-theoretic approach.
4However, we note that there are many aspects of the debate over the cost of market power in banking, particularly related
to social welfare loss versus cost inefﬁciency (see Maudos and De Guevara, 2007) that we are silent on.
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the security market interest rate (and thus in the
bank’s equity capital cost) is recognized as a govern-
ment intervention, we show that this intervention
may have more signiﬁcant impact on bank return
and risk performance during a normal time.
Episcopos (2008) argues that raising the barrier
induces a wealth transfer from shareholders to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It
implies a better protection of the insurance fund.
An increase in the bank’s equity cost may also have
more signiﬁcant on bank performance with a less
protection of the insurance fund by the FDIC, parti-
cularly with consideration of the dislike of higher
equity cost. As a result, increasing the security mar-
ket interest rate and a decreasing protection of the
deposit insurance fund tend to increase bank proﬁt-
ability and stability. The utility maximization expli-
citly taking the barrier and the dislike into account is
intimately relevant to bank regulation.
The article is organized as follows. Section II
brieﬂy reviews the related literature. Section III
develops the basic structure of the model. Section
IV derives the solution of the model and the com-
parative static analysis. Section V presents numerical
exercises to explain and compare the possible com-
parative static results. The ﬁnal section discusses the
results and limitation of the model.
II. Related Literature
Our theory of bank capital is related to the following
strands of the literature. The ﬁrst is the literature on
bank performance. Repullo (2004), Von Thadden
(2004) and Berger and Bouwman (2013) emphasize
the role of capital as a buffer to absorb shocks to
earnings. In the screening-based theory of Coval and
Thakor (2005), a minimum amount of capital is
essential to the very viability of the bank. The asset
substitution moral hazard theories argue that capital
attenuated the excessive risk-taking incentives
induced by limited liability, and that banks with
more capital optimally choose less risky portfolios
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Acharya et al., 2011).
While we also discuss bank capital, our focus on
bank capital cost with the mechanical effect of bank
interest margin determination takes our analysis in a
different direction.
The second strand is the modern equity capital cost
literature. Estrella (2004) determines the optimal
level of capital in the presence of capital costs and
failure costs, and shows that minimum capital
requirements based on Value at Risk are likely to be
pro-cyclical. Zhu (2007) introduces an equilibrium
model in which banks maximize expected dis-
counted dividends net of capital costs but are con-
strained in their lending behaviour by minimum
capital requirements. Peura and Keppo (2006) exam-
ine banks’ optimal capital choice as a trade-off
between the opportunity cost of equity capital, the
loss of franchise value following a regulatory mini-
mum capital violation and the cost of recapitaliza-
tion. Heid andKrüger (2011) demonstrate that capital
buffers mitigate volatility of banking lending. The
primacy difference between our model and these
papers is that we consider the effects on bank interest
margin from changes in the opportunity cost of
equity capital constrained in the bank’s balance
sheet activities.
The third strand of the literature is on the choice of
an appropriate goal in modelling banks’ optimization
problem. Ho and Saunders (1981), Zarruk and
Madura (1992) and Wong (1997) use a von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function deﬁned in
terms of proﬁts to examine optimal bank interest
margins. Hyun and Rhee (2011) also use a utility
function characterized by the bank’s preference to
explain the role of capital, in which the banking
industry after loan quality problems led to the most
recent ﬁnancial crisis. Alternatively, the broader con-
tingent claims approach has found an application
capital regulation related to the capital amount held
by banks (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2002;
Episcopos, 2008). This article examines bank equity
cost with spread behaviour based on an option-based
utility maximization. The fundamental insight shared
by these papers is that conformity is generated by a
desire to distinguish oneself from the ‘type’, who
wishes not to be identiﬁed. This insight is an impor-
tant aspect of equity capital cost of shareholders and
bank managers since the opportunity cost of share-
holders has direct effects on bank spread behaviour.
What distinguishes our work from this literature is
that we focus on the commingling of the assessment
of bank equity return with the assessment of bank
equity risk and, in particular, we put on the impact on
bank spread behaviour from changes in equity capital
cost in the context option-based return-risk utility
maximization during a ﬁnancial crisis and comparing
to the normal time.
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III. The Model
The model is designed to capture the following char-
acteristics of a banking ﬁrm. (1) The bank manager
maximizes his/her own expected utility including
his/her like of higher equity return and/or his/her
dislike of higher equity risk during a normal time or
a ﬁnancial crisis. (2) The bank defaults when it fails
to service its debt obligations including the two pay-
ments to depositors and shareholders in the spirit of
Heid and Krüger (2011). (3) The barrier option the-
ory of corporate security valuation is applied to the
contingent claims of the bank (Episcopos, 2008); the
work of Ronn and Verma (1986) with an application
of Episcopos (2008) is used to value the bank’s
equity risk, and the framework of Brockman and
Turtle (2003) is utilized to model the default risk in
the bank’s equity return. And, (4) the bank’s objec-
tive function is speciﬁed as the expected value of a
utility function that additively includes the like of
higher equity returns and the dislike of higher equity
risks weighted by default probabilities.5
Consider a bank that makes decisions in a single-
period horizon with two dates, 0 and 1, denoted by
t 2 ½0; 1. At t ¼ 0, the bank has the following
balance sheet:
Lþ B ¼ Dþ K (1)
where L > 0 is the amount of loans, B > 0 is the
volume of risk-free liquid assets, D > 0 is the quan-
tity of deposits and K > 0 is the stock of equity
capital.
The bank’s loans belong to a single homogeneous
class of ﬁxed rate claims that mature at t ¼ 1. The
demand for loans is governed by a downward-
sloping demand function, LðRLÞ with @L=@RL < 0
and @2L=@R2L < 0, where RL > 0 is the loan interest
rate chosen by the bank (Mukuddem-Petersen
et al., 2008).6 Loans are risky in that they are subject
to nonperformance. In addition to loans, liquid assets
earn the security market interest rate of R > 0. The
total assets Lþ B in Equation 1 are ﬁnanced partly by
deposits. The supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at
a constant market deposit rate, RD > 0 (Tsai and
Lin, 2013). Equity capital invested by the bank’s
shareholders at t ¼ 0 is tied by regulation which is
a ﬁxed proportion q of the bank’s deposits, K  qD
(VanHoose, 2007). This regulation forces the bank’s
capital position to reﬂect its asset portfolio risk,
which is consistent with the recent Basel Accord.7
As long as R is sufﬁciently higher than RD, the capital
requirement constraint is binding (Wong, 1997).
Under the assumption, the bank’s balance sheet con-
straint of Equation 1 can be restated as the form of
Lþ B ¼ Kð1=qþ 1Þ. The assumption of R > RD
also implicitly indicates that equity capital is more
costly than deposits since the security market interest
rate is usually treated as an opportunity cost of equity
capital. The explicit treatment of the equity capital
opportunity cost demonstrates that the bank faces a
trade-off between high proﬁtability with low capital
ratios and greater solvency with higher capital ratios.
Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume
that the bank’s net equity return is the expected dis-
counted dividends net of capital costs (Heid and
Krüger, 2011).
We are now ready to solve for the bank’s optimal
choice of interest margin, that is, the spread between
the loan rate chosen by the bank and the market
deposit rate. We assume that the bank’s manager
maximizes either his/her own expected utility or
that of those who exercise control over the bank’s
decisions.8 As noted by Santomero (1984), the
choice of an appropriate goal in modelling the
bank’s optimization problem remains a controversial
issue. In our model, we assume that the bank’s man-
ager likes higher equity returns, but ﬁnd the like with
a dislike of the corresponding equity risk to be
costly.9 Applying Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)
and Hermalin (2005), we assume the preference of
5Alternatively, it is recognized that the utility function may be superadditive, subadditive or multiplicative. We argue that
the aforementioned issue may provide an ample opportunity for future research.
6Results to be derived from our model do not extend to the case where the bank is a price taker in the loan market (see
Baltensperger, 1980).
7 For the Basel Accord and bank bankruptcy analysis, see Chiu et al. (2009) and Cebula (2010).
8Given separation of management from ownership, the ﬁrm’s managers may have incentives to make decisions that
maximize their own expected utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
9 This dislike need not be particularly revealed. One could as easily interpret it as an amount a risk-averse manager is willing
to forego in order to avoid a random level of equity returns. We will consider an alternative utility function without such a
dislike in the following section.
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the bank’s manager can be aggregated in such a way
that the bank acts as if it has a single-utility function
that positively weights equity returns, but negatively
weights equity risks. Assume further, as in Hermalin
(2005), that the bank’s utility function is additively
separable. The objective can be stated as
Max
RL
U S; σSð Þ ¼ 1 Pdefð ÞS þ Pdef σSð Þ (2)
where S is the market value of the bank’s net equity,
σS is the instantaneous SD of the return on S (the
net equity risk) and Pdef is the default probability
in S.10 Speciﬁcally, σS denotes the cost or disutility
(dislike) incurred by the bank’s manager and
1 Pdef and Pdef are the weights on the two com-
ponents. The lower default probability implies the
higher preference degree. The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side of Equation 2 can be identiﬁed as
the expected utility from the net equity return dis-
counted by the preference degree of the higher
return like relative to higher risk dislike, while
the second term can be identiﬁed as the expected
disutility from the net equity return risk discounted
by the preference degree. As we discuss further
below, the former can be motivated based on the
argument about the equity return realization dis-
counted by the effects of default risk on equity
returns in the spirit of Vassalou and Xing (2004),
while the latter can be motivated based on the
argument about the equity risk realization in the
spirit of Ronn and Verma (1986). The speciﬁca-
tions of S, σS and Pdef become crucial to explain
bank spread behaviour in the utility maximization
optimization.
First, we propose an equity return framework for
corporate security valuation based on a path-
dependent, barrier option model. A direct implica-
tion of this framework is that equity will be priced as
a down-and-out call (DOC) option on its underlying
assets where its payoffs depend on the particular
path followed by the underlying assets
(Merton, 1973). In this context, the market value
of the bank’s net equity, S in Equation 2, can be
written as11
S ¼ VN d1ð Þ  ZeδN d2ð Þ
 
 V H
V
 2η
N b1ð Þ  Zeδ HV
 2η2
N b2ð Þ
" #
(3)
where
V ¼ 1þ RLð ÞL;
Z ¼ 1þ RDð ÞKq þ ð1þ RÞK
 ð1þ RÞ K 1
q
þ 1
 
 L
 
;
δ ¼ R RD; η ¼ δσ2 þ
1
2
;
d1 ¼ 1σ ln
V
Z
þ δþ σ
2
2
 
; d2 ¼ d1  σ;
b1 ¼ 1σ ln
H2
VZ
þ δþ σ
2
2
 
"Z  H ; b2 ¼ b1  σ
In Equation 3, V is the market value of the bank’s
loan repayments that varies continuously over the
time interval based on a geometric Brownian motion
of the form: dV ¼ μVdt þ σVdW where μ is the
instantaneous expected rate of return on V , σ is the
instantaneous SD of the return and W is a Wiener
process. Z is the book value of the net obligation
payments at t ¼ 1, which is speciﬁed as the differ-
ence between the two payments to depositors
(deposit costs), residual claimants (equity capital
costs) and the repayments from the liquid asset
investments. δ > 0 is the spread rate between the
security market interest rate and the deposit rate,
that is, the continuously compounded riskless rate
of return. H is the value of the bank’s assets that
triggers bankruptcy (this is the barrier or knockout
value of the bank).NðÞ is the standard normal cumu-
lative distribution function evaluated at d1, d2, b1 or
b2 in the model.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Equation 3
is recognized as the difference between the expected
value of loan repayments and the present value of the
net obligation payments using the standard call (SC)
10Lin et al. (2012) also discuss the issue of equity quality during a ﬁnancial crisis.
11 In general, the standard down-and-out call option includes a standard call, a down-and-in call and the rebate payment. For
simplicity, we follow Brockman and Turtle (2003) and consider only the case without the debate term.
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option view of the bank. The inadequacy of the SC
viewpoint arises because it ignores the consequences
of bankruptcy at all points in time except maturity.
The barrier, H , can be viewed as the value of loan
repayments above which creditors cannot force dis-
solution. The second term is recognized as the dif-
ference between the SC and the DOC, which
represents a down-and-in call (DIC) option of corpo-
rate bondholders (nonnegative) claim. If the SC
valuation is a good representation of reality, then H
should be zero, and hence the term DIC vanishes.
Our model utilizes the role of barrier to describe the
alternatives of bank states during a ﬁnancial crisis
(H > 0) or during a normal time (H ¼ 0).
With information about Equation 3, we further
apply Ronn and Verma (1986) and let σS in
Equation 2 stand for the instantaneous SD of the
return on S:
σS ¼ VS
@S
@V
σ (4)
where
@S
@V
¼ Nðd1Þ þ V @Nðd1Þ
@d1
@d1
@V
 Zeδ @Nðd2Þ
@d2
@d2
@V
 


ð1 2ηÞ

H
V
2η
Nðb1Þ
þ V H
V
 2η @Nðb1Þ
@b1
@b1
@V
þ Ze
δ
V
ð2η 2Þ H
V
 2η2
Nðb2Þ
 Zeδ H
V
 2η2 @Nðb2Þ
@b2
@b2
@V

Note that σS can be interpreted as the net equity
risk, while σ can be interpreted as the loan risk.
Whether or not σS is positively related to σ depends
on the sign of the term @S=@V in Equation 4, which
captures the characteristics of the barrier used in the
article. Again, during a normal time, the term H in
Equation 4 is more likely to vanish. The equity risk in
the SC valuation is in accordance with Ronn and
Verma (1986) where the ﬁrst term ½ on the right-
hand side of @S=@V exists only.
We also use information about Equation 3 to illus-
trate an application of the DOC framework and to
predict the bankruptcy. Equation 3 implies a risk-
neutral failure probability Pdef in Equation 2 over
the interval form t 2 ½0; 1 and it can be speciﬁed
as the form by following Brockman and
Turtle (2003) to obtain the default probability of the
bank’s net equity returns and is written as
Pdef ¼ Nða1Þ þ ea2ð1 Nða3ÞÞ (5)
where
a1 ¼ 1σ ln
H
V
 δþ σ
2
2
 
; a2 ¼ 2σ2 δ
σ2
2
 
ln
H
V
;
a3 ¼  1σ ln
H
V
þ δ σ
2
2
 
We further follow Brockman and Turtle (2003) to
use a simple form ofH ¼ αZ where 0  α < 1 is the
barrier-to-debt ratio. Equation 5 with the condition of
α provides a meaningful ranking of the bank accord-
ing to its susceptibility to default.
The two relevant distinctions for our model are
whether the barrier is existent and whether the dislike
in the utility objective is included. Together they lead
to the following four scenarios:
(i) As a benchmark case, the barrier is existent
and the dislike is included. The objective is
Equation 2.
(ii) As (i), except that the dislike of σS is
excluded.
(iii) When the barrier vanishes and the dislike is
included, the objective becomes
UðSC; σSCÞ ¼ ð1 PSCÞSC
þ PSCðσSCÞ (6)
where
SC ¼ VNðd1Þ  ZeδNðd2Þ;
σSC ¼ VSC
@SC
@V
σ;
PSC ¼ Nðd3Þ;
d3 ¼ 1σ ln
V
Z
þ μ σ
2
2
 
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Note that d3 tells us how many SDs of the log of
the ratio of V=Z needs to be deviated from its mean in
order to default (Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Although
the value of SC does not depend on μ, d3 does. This is
because d3 depends on the future value of assets
which is given in d1 and d2 in Equation 6.
(iv) As (iii), except that the dislike of σSC is
excluded.
In our model, the results derived from cases (i) and
(ii) can be interpreted as ones during a ﬁnancial crisis,
while those from cases (iii) and (iv) can be interpreted
as ones during a normal time. The results derived from
cases (i) and (iii) can be identiﬁed as ones with addi-
tionally considering the preference of the dislike of
higher equity risk, while those from cases (ii) and (iv)
can be identiﬁed as ones without such that.
IV. Solutions and Results
Case (i). Partially differentiating Equation 2 with
respect to RL, the ﬁrst-order condition is given by
@UðS; σSÞ
@RL
¼  @Pdef
@RL
S þ ð1 Pdef Þ @S
@RL
 
 @Pdef
@RL
σS þ Pdef @σS
@RL
 
¼ 0
(7)
where
@Pdef
@RL
¼ @Nða1Þ
@a1
@a1
@RL
þ ea2 @a2
@RL
ð1 Nða3ÞÞ  @Nða2Þ
@a2
@a2
@RL
 
@S
@RL
¼

@V
@RL
Nðd1Þ þ @Nðd1Þ
@d1
@d1
@RL
 @Z
@RL
eδNðd2Þ  Zeδ @Nðd2Þ
@d2
@d2
@RL



@V
@RL
αZ
V
 2η
Nðb1Þ
þ V ð2ηÞ αZ
V
 2η 1
Z
@Z
@RL
 1
V
@V
@RL
 
þ V αZ
V
 2η @Nðb1Þ
@b1
@b1
@RL
 @Z
@RL
eδ
αZ
V
 2η2
Nðb2Þ
 Zeδð2η 2Þ αZ
V
 2η2
1
Z
@Z
@RL
 1
V
@V
@RL
 
Nðb2Þ
 Zeδ αZ
V
 2η2 @Nðb2Þ
@b2
@b2
@RL

@σS
@RL
¼ 1
S
@V
@RL
 V
S2
@S
@RL
 
@S
@V
σ þ V
S
@2S
@V@RL
σ
We require that the second-order condition,
@2UðS; σSÞ=@R2L < 0, needs to be satisﬁed. The
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Equation 7 can
be interpreted as the marginal weighted expected
utility of loan rate, while the second term can be
interpreted as the marginal weighted expected disu-
tility of loan rate. The optimal loan rate is obtained
where both the marginal values are equal. Sufﬁcient
condition for an optimum is that the utility function
demonstrates the like of equity return and the dislike
of equity risk. The ﬁrst-order condition for the max-
imization of expected utility determines the optimal
loan rate. If loan demand is relatively rate-elastic, a
larger loan portfolio is possible at a reduced optimal
loan rate. The increased loan amount implies that the
bank is more prone to risk-taking, yielding a
decreased equity return and an increased equity
risk, ceteris paribus.
Consider next the impact on the optimal loan
rate (and thus the optimal margin) from changes
in the equity capital cost. Implicit differentiation
of Equation 7 with respect to R yields
@RL
@R

UðS; σSÞ
¼  @
2UðS; σSÞ
@RL@R
=
@2UðS; σSÞ
@R2L
(8)
where
@2UðS; σSÞ
@RL@R
¼

 @
2Pdef
@RL@R
S  @Pdef
@RL
@S
@R
 @Pdef
@R
@S
@RL
þ ð1 Pdef Þ @
2S
@RL@R



@2Pdef
@RL@R
σS þ @Pdef
@RL
@σS
@R
þ @Pdef
@R
@σS
@RL
þ Pdef @
2σS
@RL@R

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The ﬁrst term ½ on the right-hand side of the
numerator in Equation 8 can be interpreted as the
equity return like effect, while the second term ½
can be interpreted as the equity risk dislike effect.
The like effect captures the charge in RL due to an
increase in R, holding the marginal weighted
expected disutility of loan rate constant. The dis-
like effect also captures this change, but holding
the marginal weighted expected utility constant.
Both the signs of the like and dislike effects are
indeterminate.
Case (ii). Partially differentiating Equation 2
where σS ¼ 0 with respect to RL, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition is given by
@UðSÞ
@RL
¼  @Pdef
@RL
S þ ð1 Pdef Þ @S
@RL
¼ 0 (9)
We require that the second-order condition,
@2UðSÞ=@R2L < 0, needs to be satisﬁed for the
optimization maximization of Equation 9.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of
Equation 9 can be identiﬁed as the bank equity
value weighted by the marginal default probability
of loan rate, while the second term can be
identiﬁed as the nondefault probability weighted
by the marginal equity return of loan rate. The
optimal loan rate is set when both the marginal
values equal. Sufﬁcient condition for an
optimum is that the utility function demonstrates
only the like of the equity return. In this case, the
increased loan amount at a reduced optimal loan
rate implies that the bank is more prone to risk-
taking, yielding a decreased equity return, ceteris
paribus.
Next, implicit differentiation of Equation 9 with
respect to R yields
@RL
@R

UðSÞ
¼  @
2UðSÞ
@RL@R
=
@2UðSÞ
@R2L
(10)
where
@2UðSÞ
@RL@R
¼  @
2Pdef
@RL@R
S  @Pdef
@RL
@S
@R
 @Pdef
@R
@S
@RL
þ ð1 Pdef Þ @
2S
@RL@R
Case (iii). Partially differentiating Equation 6 with
respect to RL, the ﬁrst-order condition is given by
@UðSC; σSCÞ
@RL
¼  @PSC
@RL
SC þ ð1 PSCÞ @SC
@RL
 
 @PSC
@RL
σSC þ PSC @σSC
@RL
 
¼ 0
(11)
where
@PSC
@RL
¼  @PSC
@d3
@d3
@RL
@SC
@RL
¼ @V
@RL
Nðd1Þ þ V @Nðd1Þ
@d1
@d1
@RL
 @Z
@RL
eδNðd2Þ  Zeδ @Nðd2Þ
@d2
@d2
@RL
@σSC
@RL
¼

1
SC
@V
@RL
 V
SC2
@SC
@RL

Nðd1Þ
þ V
SC
@Nðd1Þ
@d1
@d1
@RL

σ
We require that the second-order condition,
@2UðSC; σSCÞ=@R2L < 0, needs to be satisﬁed for
the optimization maximization of Equation 11.
According to the equilibrium condition of Equation
13, we obtain the optimal loan rate.
Next, implicit differentiation of Equation 11 with
respect to R yields
@RL
@R

UðSC; σSCÞ
¼  @
2UðSC; σSCÞ
@RL@R
=
@2UðSC; σSCÞ
@R2L
(12)
where
@2UðSC; σSCÞ
@RL@R
¼

 @
2PSC
@RL@R
SC  @PSC
@RL
@SC
@R
 @PSC
@R
@SC
@RL
þ ð1 PSCÞ @
2SC
@RL@R



@2PSC
@RL@R
σSC þ @PSC
@RL
@σSC
@R
þ @PSC
@R
@σSC
@RL
þ PSC @
2σSC
@RL@R

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The ﬁrst term ½ on the right-hand side of the
numerator in Equation 12 can be identiﬁed as the
like effect in form of the SC equity return, while the
second term ½ can be identiﬁed as the dislike effect
in form of the SC equity risk.
Case (iv). Partially differentiating Equation 6
where σSC ¼ 0 with respect to RL, the ﬁrst-order
condition is given by
@UðSCÞ
@RL
¼  @PSC
@RL
SC þ ð1 PSCÞ @SC
@RL
¼ 0
(13)
We require that the second-order condition,
@2UðSCÞ=@R2L < 0, needs to be satisﬁed for the
optimization maximization. The optimal loan rate
can be obtained from the equilibrium condition of
Equation 13.
Further, implicit differentiation of Equation 13
with respect to R yields
@RL
@R

UðSCÞ
¼  @
2UðSCÞ
@RL@R
=
@2UðSCÞ
@R2L
(14)
where
@2UðSCÞ
@RL@R
¼  @
2PSC
@RL@R
SC  @PSC
@RL
@SC
@R
 @PSC
@R
@SC
@RL
þ ð1 PSCÞ @
2SC
@RL@R
It is well recognized that the added complexity of
the option-based utility valuation does not always
lead to clear-cut results of Equations 8, 10, 12 and
14. But we can certainly denote tendencies for rea-
sonable parameter levels that roughly correspond to
the comparative static results. These four cases will
be analysed and compared in the next section using a
numerical exercise approach.
V. Numerical Exercises
Unless otherwise stated, a more tractable scenario
assumes that the parameter levels are RD ¼ 2:25%,
Lþ B ¼ 335:50, D ¼ 305, q ¼ 10:00%, σ ¼ 0:20,
μ ¼ 0:15 and α ¼ 0:60 for a hypothetical bank. Let
ðRL%; LÞ change from (5.00, 298) to (6.25, 273) due
to the conditions of @L=@RL < 0 and @2L=@R2L < 0,
and let R% increase from 2.75 to 4.50.12 The condi-
tion of R > RD indicates the existence of capital cost
(Heid and Krüger, 2011), the condition of RL > R
implies the fund reserve as liquidity and substitution
in the earning asset portfolio (Kashyap et al., 2002),
and the condition of RL > RD demonstrates the bank
interest margin as a proxy for the efﬁciency of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation (Tsai, 2012). The regulatory para-
meter of q ¼ 10:00% illustrates a possible
speciﬁcation of capital adequacy requirements,
which is implicitly consistent with the standardized
approach of the Basel Accord (VanHoose, 2007).
α ¼ 0:60 indicates a possible level of barrier
(Brockman and Turtle, 2003).13
Case (i). We ﬁrst compute the value UðS; σSÞ
based on the speciﬁcation of Equation 2. Next,
using equilibrium information about Equation 7, we
calculate @U2ðS; σSÞ=@RL@R and @U2ðS; σSÞ=@R2L
in order to obtain the comparative static result of
@RL=@R in Equation 8. The ﬁndings are summarized
in Table 1.
In Table 1, we observe the results ofUðS; σSÞ > 0,
@2UðS; σSÞ=@R2L < 0 and @RL=@R > 0.14 Note that
@2UðS; σSÞ=@R2L < 0 conﬁrms the second-order
condition. The optimal loan rate is set to be 5.50%
approximately that is observed from the shaded areas
in Table 1. @RL=@R > 0observed from the last panel
demonstrates that, as the cost of bank equity capital
12 The riskless rate R% is given by the compounded return on 1-year US treasuring bills. According to Brockman and
Turtle (2003), the mean value of R% is 5.81% with a corresponding SD of 2.07%. For simplicity, our numerical analysis is
limited to the range between 2.75% and 4.50%.
13According to the empirical study of Brockman and Turtle (2003), the average barrier is 0.6920 with a corresponding SD
of 0.2259, and the barrier in retail is 0.6681 with a corresponding SD of 0.2024 during the sample period of 1981–1998. In
our numerical exercises, we assume that the barrier is equal to 0.60, allowing the inclusion of a more realistic state.
14 The number of @RL=@R evaluated at the optimal loan rate is rather small. This result is understood because the dependent
variable RL is a function of R, RD, B,D, q, σ, μ and α in our model. According to the empirical results observed from Slovin
and Sushka (1983), the effects of @RL=@R are 0.2573, 0.0958, 0.0282, 0.0466, 0.0221, 0.0253, 0.031 and 0.0758 as the
independent variables are increased.
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increases (i.e. the government increases the interest
rate of Federal funds), the bank interest margin is
increased.
Intuitively, as the bank is regulated by an increase
of the interest rate of the Federal funds, it must now
provide a return to a higher equity capital cost, expli-
citly taking an equity risk dislike into account. One
way the bank may attempt to augment its total returns
is by shifting its investments from its loan portfolio to
the Federal funds market. If loan demand is relatively
rate-elastic, a smaller loan portfolio and larger
Federal funds are possible at an increased margin.
Furthermore, an increased loan rate set by the bank
can be explained as an increased bank interest margin
positively related to the like, while a decreased loan
amount held by the bank can be explained as a
decreased loan risk positively related to the dislike.
As a result, the bank’s utility increases when the
bankfaces a higher capital cost. Our result is consis-
tent with the ﬁnding of Wong (1997) that the optimal
loan rate (and thus the optimal bank interest margin)
is positively related to the interest rate of the Federal
funds, and it leads to decrease the loan risk-taking at
an increased margin. It further implies a better return
and risk performance for the bank.15 Our ﬁnding also
provides an alternative explanation for that equity
capital cost attenuates the excessive risk-taking
incentives induced by bank spread behaviour,
Table 1. Values of U(S, σS) and ∂RL/∂R in Equation 8
ðRL%; LÞ
R% (5.00, 298) (5.25, 295) (5.50, 291) (5.75, 286) (6.00, 280) (6.25, 273)
U(S, σS)
2.75 29.4440 29.6068 29.6646 29.6128 29.4467 29.1613
3.00 29.8568 30.0231 30.0846 30.0363 29.8737 29.5919
3.25 30.2724 30.4423 30.5073 30.4627 30.3037 30.0255
3.50 30.6907 30.8643 30.9330 30.8920 30.7366 30.4621
3.75 31.1119 31.2891 31.3614 31.3241 31.1724 30.9016
4.00 31.5358 31.7167 31.7926 31.7590 31.6111 31.3440
4.25 31.9625 32.1470 32.2266 32.1967 32.0526 31.7893
4.50 32.3918 32.5800 32.6634 32.6372 32.4968 32.2375
@2UðS; σSÞ=@R2L;%
2.75 – −10.4917 −10.9614 −11.4378 −11.9206 –
3.00 – −10.4932 −10.9628 −11.4390 −11.9215 –
3.25 – −10.4937 −10.9632 −11.4390 −11.9211 –
3.50 – −10.4934 −10.9626 −11.4380 −11.9193 –
3.75 – −10.4921 −10.9610 −11.4358 −11.9164 –
4.00 – −10.4900 −10.9584 −11.4325 −11.9121 –
4.25 – −10.4870 −10.9549 −11.4282 −11.9067 –
4.50 – −10.4832 −10.9504 −11.4229 −11.9001 –
@RL=@R ¼ ð@2UðS; σSÞ=@RL@RÞ=ð@2UðS; σSÞ=@R2LÞ
2.75→3.00 – 0.0342 0.0326 0.0311 0.0298 –
3.00→3.25 – 0.0344 0.0329 0.0315 0.0303 –
3.25→3.50 – 0.0346 0.0332 0.0319 0.0307 –
3.50→3.75 – 0.0348 0.0334 0.0322 0.0312 –
3.75→4.00 – 0.0350 0.0337 0.0326 0.0316 –
4.00→4.25 – 0.0351 0.0340 0.0329 0.0321 –
4.25→4.50 – 0.0353 0.0342 0.0333 0.0325 –
Notes: The value of utility in Equation 2 is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise:
RD ¼ 2:25%, Lþ B ¼ 335:50, D ¼ 305, q ¼ 10:00%, σ ¼ 0:20, μ ¼ 0:10 and α ¼ 0:60.
15Note that the bank’s objective in Wong (1997) is to set the loan rate to maximize the expected value of a Von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility function deﬁned in terms of proﬁts, subject to the bank’s liquidity constraint. The comparative static
result obtained above is based on a constant level of capital. Wong (1997) demonstrates that an increase in the bank’s equity
capital will decrease the optimal bank interest. Zarruk and Madura (1992) also argue that an increase in the capital-to-
deposits ratio decreases the optimal bank interest margin. In this article, we do not address the issue of capital regulation.
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supported by Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Acharya
et al. (2011).
Case (ii). Based on the observations of Table 2,
@2UðSÞ=@R2L < 0 indicates the validness of the
second-order condition. The optimal loan rate is
approximately 5.50% observed from the shaded
area of the ﬁrst panel. The result of @RL=@R > 0
observed from the last panel demonstrates that an
increase in the equity capital cost has a positive
effect on the bank interest margin when the dislike
of higher equity risk is ignored. The interpretation
of this result follows a similar argument as in the
case of the barrier option with disutility of case (i).
Basically, increases in the cost of equity encourage
the bank to shifts to the Federal funds from its loan
portfolio. In an imperfect loan market, the bank
must increase the size of its spread in order to
reduce the amount of loans.
Case (iii). In Table 3, we have the results of
UðSC; σSCÞ > 0, @2UðSC; σSCÞ=@R2L < 0 and
@RL=@R > 0. The optimal loan rate is approximately
6.00% observed from the shaded area in the ﬁrst
panel. The result of @RL=@R > 0 is observed from
the last panel when the SC framework is a good
representation of reality (i.e. the barrier should be
zero). There is again the bank interest margin posi-
tively related to equity capital cost.
Case (iv). In Table 4, we observe the results of
UðSCÞ > 0, @2UðSCÞ=@R2L < 0 and @RL=@R > 0.
The optimal loan rate is approximately 6.00% based
on the numerical parameters used in the exercise.
Again, we have the result of @RL=@R > 0 observed
from the last panel when the barrier and the dislike
are ignored.
Based on the results presented in Tables 1–4, it has
been consistently shown that an increase in the
Table 2. Values of U(S) and ∂RL/∂R in Equation 10
ðRL%; LÞ
R% (5.00, 298) (5.25, 295) (5.50, 291) (5.75, 286) (6.00, 280) (6.25, 273)
UðSÞ
2.75 29.4552 29.6175 29.6749 29.6227 29.4561 29.1704
3.00 29.8675 30.0334 30.0944 30.0458 29.8828 29.6006
3.25 30.2827 30.4522 30.5168 30.4718 30.3124 30.0338
3.50 30.7006 30.8738 30.9421 30.9007 30.7450 30.4700
3.75 31.1214 31.2982 31.3701 31.3324 31.1804 30.9092
4.00 31.5449 31.7254 31.8010 31.7670 31.6187 31.3513
4.25 31.9712 32.1554 32.2347 32.2044 32.0599 31.7963
4.50 32.4003 32.5881 32.6711 32.6446 32.5038 32.2441
@2UðSÞ=@R2L;%
2.75 – −10.4903 −10.9601 −11.4365 −11.9194 –
3.00 – −10.4919 −10.9617 −11.4379 −11.9204 –
3.25 – −10.4926 −10.9622 −11.4380 −11.9201 –
3.50 – −10.4924 −10.9617 −11.4371 −11.9185 –
3.75 – −10.4913 −10.9602 −11.4350 −11.9157 –
4.00 – −10.4893 −10.9577 −11.4319 −11.9116 –
4.25 – −10.4864 −10.9543 −11.4277 −11.9062 –
4.50 – −10.4827 −10.9500 −11.4225 −11.8997 –
@RL=@R ¼ ð@2UðSÞ=@RL@RÞ=ð@2UðSÞ=@R2LÞ
2.75→3.00 – 0.0343 0.0327 0.0312 0.0298 –
3.00→3.25 – 0.0345 0.0329 0.0316 0.0303 –
3.25→3.50 – 0.0347 0.0332 0.0319 0.0308 –
3.50→3.75 – 0.0349 0.0335 0.0323 0.0312 –
3.75→4.00 – 0.0351 0.0338 0.0327 0.0317 –
4.00→4.25 – 0.0352 0.0340 0.0330 0.0321 –
4.25→4.50 – 0.0354 0.0343 0.0333 0.0325 –
Notes: The value of utility in Equation 2 with σS ¼ 0 is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated
otherwise: RD ¼ 2:25%, Lþ B ¼ 335:50, D ¼ 305, q ¼ 10:00%, σ ¼ 0:20, μ ¼ 0:10 and α ¼ 0:60.
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interest rate of Federal funds (and hence an increase
in the bank’s equity capital cost) has a positive effect
on the bank interest margin. It is interesting to further
compare those four cases in order to analyse the
robustness of the equity capital cost impacts. The
ﬁndings are summarized in Table 5.
We have the following several main results. First,
we show that the optimal bank margin with high loan
variability (α ¼ 0:60 perhaps during a ﬁnancial cri-
sis) is smaller than that with low one (α ¼ 0 perhaps
during a normal time). This result is intuitive because
the bank can lend from both the loan and the liquid
asset market. As loans credit risk burden makes the
bank less prone to loan risk-taking at a lower margin.
Loan variability as such further decreases the
weighted default probability and then increases the
like of higher equity return and/or decreases the dis-
like of higher equity risk. And, this results in an
increase of the bank’s maximum utility as observed
from the upper panel of Table 5.
Next, in the four scenarios observed from the
lower panel, we have shown that an increase in the
bank’s equity capital cost has a positive effect on
margin and a negative effect on loan risk-taking
incentives, implying a better return and risk perfor-
mance. Overall, we can argue that an increase in the
interest of Federal funds by the government, even
though the bank’s equity capital cost may have been
increased, can contribute to increase bank proﬁtabil-
ity and to stabilize the banking system. As a bench-
mark, the bank’s utility maximization in case (i)
explicitly considers both the barrier of bankruptcy
probability during a ﬁnancial crisis and the dislike of
higher equity risk due to the revealed preference.
Comparing these four scenarios, both the utility per-
formance and the equity cost effect on margin may be
Table 3. Values of U(SC, σSC) and ∂RL/∂R in Equation 12
ðRL%; LÞ
R% (5.00, 298) (5.25, 295) (5.50, 291) (5.75, 286) (6.00, 280) (6.25, 273)
UðSC; σSCÞ
2.75 20.5165 20.7575 20.9244 21.0127 21.0176 20.9343
3.00 20.8079 21.0546 21.2276 21.3225 21.3346 21.2590
3.25 21.1014 21.3538 21.5330 21.6347 21.6541 21.5864
3.50 21.3970 21.6551 21.8407 21.9492 21.9760 21.9163
3.75 21.6947 21.9586 22.1505 22.2660 22.3003 22.2488
4.00 21.9944 22.2642 22.4626 22.5851 22.6271 22.5839
4.25 22.2962 22.5719 22.7768 22.9065 22.9563 22.9215
4.50 22.6000 22.8817 23.0932 23.2301 23.2878 23.2617
@2UðSC; σSCÞ=@R2L
2.75 – −0.0741 −0.0787 −0.0834 −0.0882 –
3.00 – −0.0736 −0.0782 −0.0828 −0.0876 –
3.25 – −0.0731 −0.0776 −0.0823 −0.0870 –
3.50 – −0.0725 −0.0771 −0.0817 −0.0865 –
3.75 – −0.0720 −0.0765 −0.0811 −0.0858 –
4.00 – −0.0714 −0.0759 −0.0805 −0.0852 –
4.25 – −0.0708 −0.0753 −0.0799 −0.0845 –
4.50 – −0.0702 −0.0746 −0.0792 −0.0838 –
@RL=@R ¼ ð@2UðSC; σSCÞ=@RL@RÞ=ð@2UðSC; σSCÞ=@R2LÞ
2.75→3.00 – 0.0835 0.0851 0.0867 0.0882 –
3.00→3.25 – 0.0851 0.0870 0.0888 0.0905 –
3.25→3.50 – 0.0868 0.0889 0.0909 0.0928 –
3.50→3.75 – 0.0886 0.0909 0.0931 0.0952 –
3.75→4.00 – 0.0904 0.0929 0.0953 0.0977 –
4.00→4.25 – 0.0922 0.0949 0.0976 0.1002 –
4.25→4.50 – 0.0941 0.0970 0.0999 0.1027 –
Notes: The value of utility in Equation 6 is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise:
RD ¼ 2:25%, Lþ B ¼ 335:50, D ¼ 305, q ¼ 10:00%, σ ¼ 0:20, μ ¼ 0:10 and α ¼ 0:60.
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overestimated if the dislike preference is not
included. The results can also be applied to the
cases without considering the barrier (cases (iii) and
(iv)). In addition, the utility performance is under-
estimated and the equity cost effect on margin is
overestimated without barrier. Accordingly, we
argue that the choice of an appropriate goal in mod-
elling the bank’s optimization problem is a crucial
issue.
One immediate application of this article is to
propose a conceptual structure for the degree of risk
aversion based on the barrier and the dislike realiza-
tion instead of the commonly used exogenous
approach. In particular, the degree of risk aversion
captured only by the default risk in the bank’s equity
returns without considering both the barrier and the
dislike, case (iv), can be recognized as most likely the
weakest one, whereas case (i) is most likely the
strongest one. We show that bank performance
related to proﬁtability and stability decreases as the
bank increases its risk aversion. If the barrier is not
existent, a bank may increase its performance as the
bank becomes more risk-averse dominated by only
the dislike (UðSC; σSCÞ in case (iii) versusUðSCÞ in
case (iv)). If the dislike is ignored, a bank decreases
its performance as the bank becomes more risk-
averse dominated by only the barrier (UðS; σSÞ in
case (i) versus UðSÞ in case (ii)). As a result, if the
barrier is inevitable during a ﬁnancial crisis, a bank
manager should explicitly integrate the equity risk
with its utility maximization to increase its perfor-
mance when a bank facing a high equity capital cost.
The importance of the barrier and the dislike
realization should be emphasized in modelling the
bank’s optimization problem, particularly when the
government regulates the interest rate of the Federal
Table 4. Values of U(SC) and ∂RL/∂R in Equation 14
ðRL%; LÞ
R% (5.00, 298) (5.25, 295) (5.50, 291) (5.75, 286) (6.00, 280) (6.25, 273)
UðSCÞ
2.75 20.8929 21.1267 21.2864 21.3675 21.3654 21.2751
3.00 21.1821 21.4215 21.5873 21.6750 21.6799 21.5972
3.25 21.4735 21.7185 21.8905 21.9849 21.9969 21.9219
3.50 21.7669 22.0177 22.1959 22.2970 22.3164 22.2493
3.75 22.0624 22.3190 22.5035 22.6115 22.6383 22.5793
4.00 22.3600 22.6224 22.8133 22.9283 22.9627 22.9118
4.25 22.6597 22.9279 23.1253 23.2474 23.2894 23.2469
4.50 22.9613 23.2356 23.4395 23.5687 23.6186 23.5845
@2UðSCÞ=@R2L
2.75 – −0.0740 −0.0786 −0.0833 −0.0881 –
3.00 – −0.0735 −0.0781 −0.0828 −0.0876 –
3.25 – −0.0730 −0.0776 −0.0823 −0.0871 –
3.50 – −0.0725 −0.0771 −0.0817 −0.0865 –
3.75 – −0.0720 −0.0765 −0.0812 −0.0859 –
4.00 – −0.0714 −0.0760 −0.0806 −0.0853 –
4.25 – −0.0709 −0.0754 −0.0800 −0.0846 –
4.50 – −0.0703 −0.0748 −0.0793 −0.0840 –
@RL=@R ¼ ð@2UðSCÞ=@RL@RÞ=ð@2UðSCÞ=@R2LÞ
2.75→3.00 – 0.0827 0.0841 0.0853 0.0865 –
3.00→3.25 – 0.0843 0.0859 0.0874 0.0888 –
3.25→3.50 – 0.0860 0.0878 0.0895 0.0911 –
3.50→3.75 – 0.0877 0.0897 0.0916 0.0935 –
3.75→4.00 – 0.0895 0.0917 0.0938 0.0959 –
4.00→4.25 – 0.0913 0.0937 0.0961 0.0984 –
4.25→4.50 – 0.0932 0.0958 0.0984 0.1010 –
Notes: The value of utility in Equation 6 with σSC ¼ 0 is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated
otherwise: RD ¼ 2:25%, Lþ B ¼ 335:50, D ¼ 305, q ¼ 10:00%, σ ¼ 0:20, μ ¼ 0:10 and α ¼ 0:60.
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funds and the FDIC attempts to protect its deposit
insurance fund. Brockman and Turtle (2003) argue
that ﬁrms with high asset variability are likely to
exhibit a higher probability of hitting the barrier
before the expiration date than the others. Barrier
can also reduce bank performance as equity capital
cost increases. Further, Episcopos (2008) argue that
banking is an ideal environment for the barrier
option model because the FDIC as a regulator/
insurer controls the barrier in a very direct manner
by the power vested by the FDIC Improvement Act.
Raising the barrier induces a wealth transfer to the
FDIC from shareholders, implying a better protec-
tion of the insurance fund. Under such circum-
stances, we show that bank performance reduces
as the bank’s equity capital cost increases. As a
result, we suggest that the bank should attenuate
the excessive risk-taking incentives in its loan port-
folio investment and explicitly take its equity risk
dislike preference into account for obtaining a better
return and risk performance when the regulatory
authorities increase the security market interest
rate and decrease the deposit insurance fund
protection.
VI. Conclusion
This article proposes a utility framework for bank
regulation based on the barrier option model of
Brockman and Turtle (2003) and the equity risk
model of Ronn and Verma (1986). Several results are
derived and those should be of interest to investors,
bank managers and policymakers. For example, an
increase in the bank’s equity capital cost due to increas-
ing the interest rate of the Federal funds by the govern-
ment results in decreasing the excessive loan risk-
taking incentives at an increased bank interest margin.
This simply implies a better return and risk perfor-
mance for the bank. Under certain circumstances, an
increase in the barrier due to a better protection of
deposit insurance fund can reduce the bank’s perfor-
mance. Furthermore, an increase in the barrier with the
consideration of the equity risk in the bank’s utility
objective increases the bank’s performance. In conclu-
sion, it is shown that the barrier and the dislike of
higher equity risk are intimately relevant to bank
spread behaviour under government regulation.
Another issue that has not been addressed is the
dislike of higher equity risk linking to credit risk
Table 5. Robustness with respect to R
α ¼ 0:60 during a ﬁnancial crisis α ¼ 0 during a normal time
σS > 0 σS ¼ 0 σSC > 0 σSC ¼ 0
R:L ¼ 5:50% R:L ¼ 5:50% R:L ¼ 6:00% R:L ¼ 6:00%
R% Case (i) Case (ii) Case (iii) Case (iv)
UðS; σSÞ UðSÞ UðSC; σSCÞ UðSCÞ
3.00 30.0846 30.0944 21.3346 21.6799
3.25 30.5073 30.5168 21.6541 21.9969
3.50 30.9330 30.9421 21.9760 22.3164
3.75 31.3614 31.3701 22.3003 22.6383
4.00 31.7926 31.8010 22.6271 22.9627
4.25 32.2266 32.2347 22.9563 23.2894
4.50 32.6634 32.6711 23.2878 23.6186
@RL=@R
2.75→3.00 0.0326 0.0327 0.0882 0.0865
3.00→3.25 0.0329 0.0329 0.0905 0.0888
3.25→3.50 0.0332 0.0332 0.0928 0.0911
3.50→3.75 0.0334 0.0335 0.0952 0.0935
3.75→4.00 0.0337 0.0338 0.0977 0.0959
4.00→4.25 0.0340 0.0340 0.1002 0.0984
4.25→4.50 0.0342 0.0343 0.1027 0.1010
Notes: The results of cases (i)–(iv) are collected from the shaded areas of Tables 1–4, respectively. The maximum levels of
utility in cases (i) and (ii) are UðS; σSÞ and UðSÞ with a corresponding approximate optimal loan rate (RL) of 5.50%, and
those in cases (iii) and (iv) are UðSC; σSCÞ and UðSCÞ with R:L ¼ 6:00%.
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transfer. Since the dislike and/or the barrier may be
replaced by credit risk transfers at costs, whether the
results derived from this article can be applied to the
credit risk transfer case may be an interesting issue.
In a very simple rational expectation framework, the
answer is expected to be positive. Of course, in a
world without such a strict rational expectation
requirement, other factors would affect the costs of
credit risk transfers. For example, credit risk pricing
may play a very important role and add complexity
due to information asymmetries. Such a concern is
beyond the scope of our study and so is not addressed
here. What this article does demonstrate, however, is
the important role played by the dislike of the pre-
ferences and the barrier in the equity return valuation
in affecting bank spread behaviour.
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